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Executive Summary 
California’s low carbon fuel standard (LCFS) specifies that the state’s transportation fuel supply 
achieve a 20% reduction in carbon intensity (CI) below 2011 levels by 2030. Reaching the 
standard will require substantive changes in the fuel mix, but the specifics and the cost of these 
changes are uncertain. Since the policy was extended in 2019, the price of LCFS compliance 
credits has been close to its maximum allowed value, which indicates that fuel-market traders 
expect compliance to be expensive to achieve, if it can be achieved at all. Uncertainty 
surrounding compliance stems from the unknown future market penetration of alternatives to 
the internal combustion engine, such as electric vehicles, as well uncertainty about growth in 
the state economy, oil prices, vehicle miles traveled, and fuel economy. 
In this report, we assess if and how California is likely to achieve the proposed 20% reduction in 
CI values by 2030, and the likely impact of infrastructure credits on this compliance outlook. We 
take an approach similar to Borenstein et al. (2019) in their paper on cap-and-trade markets. 
We begin by projecting a distribution of fuel and vehicle miles demand under business-as-usual 
(BAU) economic and policy variation. We use the term BAU to imply continuation of the trends, 
correlations and volatility observed in the data since 1987. We transform our BAU projections 
into a distribution of LCFS net deficits for the entire period from 2019 through 2030, assuming a 
steady draw-down of the currently accumulated credit “bank.” Given the stable long-run 
relationships between fuel markets, oil prices, vehicle miles, and general economic activity, we 
employ a vector error correction (VEC) model to account for the cointegration between these 
variables when estimating coefficients. This approach results in projected outcomes that 
become more uncertain as predictions move farther out of sample and allows us to project 
distributions of demand under BAU economic conditions. We fit our model using quarterly data 
from 1987-2018 and make projections for years 2019-2030, which we refer to as the 
compliance period. 
We then construct a variety of scenarios characterizing LCFS credit supply that consider 
different assumptions regarding input markets, technological adoption over the compliance 
period, and the efficacy of complementary policies. By interacting our distribution of demand 
outcomes with various supply scenarios for LCFS credits, we are able to estimate the 
equilibrium number of LCFS credits supplied to the market for various credit-generating sources 
and analyze the change in those quantities across scenarios. Given our distribution of deficits 
and estimates of credits under each scenario, we can assess the fuel mix in the diesel pool 
required to achieve annual compliance. 
In our baseline scenario for credit generation, LCFS compliance would require that between 
60% and 80% of the diesel pool be produced from biomass. Our baseline projections have the 
number of electric vehicles reaching 1.3 million by 2030, however if the number of electric 
vehicles increases more rapidly than what is captured under BAU conditions, and reaches 
Governor Jerry Brown’s goal of 5 million vehicles by 2030, then LCFS compliance would require 
substantially less biomass-based diesel. Under this scenario, annual compliance could be 
achieved with between 10% and 25% biomass-based diesel in the diesel pool, which is 
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commensurate with recent levels and could be achievable with an indexed $200 credit price 
through 2030. 
Outside of rapid zero tailpipe-emission vehicle (ZEV) penetration, compliance in 2030 with the 
$200 credit price may be much more difficult. For instance, a scenario in which carbon capture 
and sequestration (CCS) is widely adopted in ethanol plants would bring the median biomass-
based diesel (BBD) blend rate down to approximately 45% BBD in 2030, rather than 60%. 
However, a 45% blend rate in 2030 under this scenario still results in nearly a 125% increase 
from current levels. Additionally, if increasing BBD production calls for an increasing amount of 
higher-CI feedstocks, the implied blend rate required for compliance could increase above the 
baseline. If the volume-weighted average CI rating of BBD were to increase, which is plausible, 
then the median draw requires nearly 100% of diesel to be biomass-based. 
New mechanisms to allow firms to generate credits by building electric vehicle charging stations 
or hydrogen fueling stations have minor implications for overall compliance. This mechanism 
represents a major departure from the original design of the LCFS as it does not directly 
subsidize the consumption of a low carbon fuel. Rather, the credits subsidize a fixed cost of 
providing network infrastructure that may encourage adoption of electric vehicles, the 
technology which may in turn use a low carbon fuel. In the same way, however, the 
infrastructure credit can reduce the very effect that LCFS critics have focused on as the central 
flaw in the regulations design: the encouragement of low, but still non-zero carbon fuel. 
Nonetheless, because the total quantity of infrastructure credits is restricted to be relatively 
small, their effect on potential compliance scenarios is small.  
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1. Introduction 
State and local policy makers in the U.S. and beyond are looking to low carbon fuel standards 
(LCFSs) as a policy instrument for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the transportation 
sector. California implemented its LCFS in 2011, setting a target of a 10% reduction in carbon 
intensity (CI) values for transport fuels used in the state by 2030 from 2011 levels, as part of its 
climate policy. The target has since been updated to a 20% reduction below 2011 levels by 
2030. Oregon fully implemented its LCFS, the Clean Fuels Program (CFP), in 2016, seeking to 
reduce CI values of Oregon transportation fuels by 10% from 2015 to 2025.1,2 Washington State 
failed in several legislative attempts to pass an LCFS that proposed a 10% reduction over a 10-
year period, most recently in 2019.3 Also in Washington State, Puget Sound Air Quality Agency 
is considering a regional clean fuel standard to contribute to its 2030 greenhouse gas emissions 
goals.4 Other jurisdictions with, developing, or considering an LCFS-like program include British 
Columbia (in effect since 2011), Canada and Brazil (under development), and Colorado (initial 
feasibility analysis).5 
While the LCFS regulation is now moving forward, its history is not without controversy. There 
have been legal challenges linked to the way it differentiates fuels originating in different 
locations. There have also been extensive debates about the life-cycle calculations used to 
establish the carbon intensities of different fuels used for compliance, particularly aspects 
linked to the indirect land use effects caused by biofuels. More recently, opponents have 
pointed to increasing costs of compliance and raised concerns about both the efficiency of the 
regulation and its potential impact on fuel prices. Such concerns contributed to the rejection of 
the LCFS mechanism in some states. 
Partly in response to concerns over compliance costs, and partly in an effort to spur more 
innovation, new dimensions have continued to be added to the LCFS. In California, regulators 
have allowed the expansion of “book-and-claim,” an accounting mechanism that allows certain 
specialized fuels, particularly bio-methane sourced from dairy digesters, to be physically 
consumed in one state but still allowed to generate LCFS credits in another. In another 
departure from the original design, the LCFS will also now award credits for investment in 
infrastructure related to electric vehicle (EV) charging facilities and hydrogen fueling stations. 
This decoupling of credit generation from fuel consumed within the state could affect both the 
long run credit price and its transmission through to various types of fuels. However, such 
effects will arise only if sufficient infrastructure credits are generated to alter the long-run 
marginal options for compliance. 
 
1 See https://www.oregon.gov/deq/aq/programs/Pages/Clean-Fuels.aspx for more information on 
the Oregon CFP. 
2 See, also, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0ct4m7gs. 
3 See https://washingtonstatewire.com/whats-next-for-a-low-carbon-fuel-standard/. 
4 See https://www.pscleanair.org/528/Clean-Fuel-Standard/. 
5 For information on Colorado, see https://ngtnews.com/colorado-looks-into-establishingcarbon-fuel-standard. 
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In this report, we assess if and how California is likely to achieve the proposed 20% reduction in 
CI values by 2030, and the likely impact of infrastructure credits on this compliance outlook. We 
follow a general methodology similar to that used in Borenstein et al. (2019) for the California 
cap-and-trade program. We apply time-series econometric methods to account for uncertainty 
in demand under business-as-usual (BAU) as indicated by historical data on a range of key 
variables. We begin by projecting a distribution of demand for fuel and vehicle miles under BAU 
economic and policy variation, which we define as continuation of the trends and correlations 
since 1987. We then transform those projections into a distribution of LCFS net deficits for the 
entire period from 2019 through 2030, assuming a steady drawdown of the currently 
accumulated credit “bank.” The distribution of net deficits illustrates a range of possibilities of 
demand for LCFS credits based on historical trends. Next, we generate LCFS credit supply 
scenarios that consider a variety of assumptions about inputs, technology, and the efficacy of 
complementary policies. By interacting projections of demand and various supply scenarios for 
LCFS credits, we can characterize the equilibrium number of credits generated under varying 
policy conditions and, furthermore, illustrate the changes in the fuel mix that would be 
necessary to achieve compliance. 
For sources of credit generation not yet prevalent in the policy, we use California Air Resource 
Board (CARB) figures based on the modeling it used in its scoping plan. These sources include 
the potential role of a new category for credit generation, ZEV infrastructure capacity credits.6 
Credit supply scenarios also cover certain state goals, showing sensitivity of results to, for 
example, meeting the Governor’s goals for battery EVs in the light duty sector by 2030. State 
policies impacting the demand side such as vehicle efficiency standards and target reductions in 
vehicle miles traveled, are not explicitly modeled, although the modeled uncertainty in the BAU 
scenario takes account of past trends in these variables and allows for considerable variability. 
Targeted scenario modeling of demand side policies and additional supply side policies is a 
possible area for future research. 
The remainder of this report is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the background of the 
California LCFS, discussing the history of the policy, recent trends, and the economic 
mechanisms through which CI standards influence markets. In section 3, we describe our data 
and econometric model used to forecast BAU demand for LCFS credits and discuss the 
projected outcomes. In section 4, we characterize a variety of scenarios regarding LCFS credit 
supply and assess annual compliance in each. Finally, in section 5, we conclude by discussing 
the implications of our analysis and highlight opportunities for future research. 
2. Background: The California LCFS 
The California LCFS was initially implemented in 2011, amended in 2013, re-adopted in 2015, 
and extended in 2019 to set targets through 2030. The LCFS is a standard whereby providers of 
transportation fuel (e.g., oil companies and refiners) are required to reduce the carbon 
intensity (CI) of their fuel mix each year. Each year, the CI must be reduced further below the CI 
 
6 CARB credit generation assumptions from the scoping plan modeling include that a variety of state targets will be 
met, and an LCFS credit price of approximately $125/MTCO2e. 
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of a petroleum-based reference fuel (e.g., 0.25% below the reference fuel in 2011 to 10% below 
in 2020). The reference fuels are diesel, E10 gasoline, and, from 2019 forward, jet fuel. The LCFS 
falls within a general regulatory framework known as intensity standards. It regulates the 
carbon intensity of transportation fuels measured in CO2e per megajoule of energy, rather than 
the total amount of CO2 released through fuels. 
As with all intensity standard mechanisms, the LCFS implicitly subsidizes the sales of fuels that 
are cleaner—that is, lower in carbon intensity—than the standard, and pays for the subsidy 
through charges imposed on fuel that is ‘dirtier’ than the standard (CI rating above the 
standard). Sales of individual fuels rated at a CI below the standard generate credits, and sales 
of fuels rated at a CI above the standard generate deficits, in amounts proportionate to 
volumes. The LCFS requires annual compliance by regulated entities; all incurred deficits must 
be met by credits generated by production of low-carbon fuels or purchased from a credit 
market. The units of LCFS credits are dollars per metric ton of CO2e. LCFS credits can be banked 
without limit, allowing overcompliance under less stringent standards to help cover increased 
obligations as the standard grows more stringent, and they are fungible—meaning credits 
generated in any fuel pool are treated equivalently. 
One of the attractions of policies like the LCFS to the policy community is that these subsidies 
and charges work to partially offset each other and dilute the pass-through of the implied 
carbon cost to retail fuel prices. This ‘feature’ of the LCFS has also been criticized by 
environmental economists, who note that the dilution of the carbon cost works to encourage 
more fuel consumption than would arise under alternative instruments such as a carbon tax.7 In 
an extreme case, the subsidy of ‘cleaner’ fuel could spur consumption growth to the point 
where the quantity of fuel that is consumed overwhelms the reduction in the carbon intensity 
of the fuel, and carbon emissions can increase. This extreme case is unlikely as it would require 
very price-elastic fuel demand. However, the overall point that, relative to other regulations, 
the LCFS can encourage consumption of fuels has continued to raise concerns in some circles. 
CARB set annual standards for the CI of fuels in both the diesel and gasoline pools. These 
annual mandates are shown in the appendix in Table 7. LCFS credits are awarded to fuels with a 
reported CI rating below the standard, and LCFS deficits to those above the standard. The 
number of credits per unit of fuel depends on the CI rating of that fuel. The LCFS is energy-
based and thus the number of credits per unit of fuel also depends on factors regarding the 
energy output of the fuel.8 
2.1 LCFS and Infrastructure Credits 
Early policy development and academic research on the LCFS focused on its characteristic as an 
intensity standard targeting the marginal costs of fuels. As described above, per unit costs of 
cleaner fuels would be reduced through the subsidy effect and the costs of dirtier fuels would 
 
7 See Holland, Hughes, and Knittel 2009. 
8 See Holland, Hughes, and Knittel 2009 for more information regarding energy based LCFS relative to other types 
of LCFS. 
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reflect the cost of acquiring credits. Recent revisions to the LCFS program have increased the 
role of alternative forms of compliance, in particular, the ability of fuel suppliers to generate 
credits through the installation of infrastructure, rather than the production of fuel. 
Fueling infrastructure credits are limited to ZEVs—i.e., hydrogen fuel cell vehicles and battery 
EVs. LCFS infrastructure credits can be generated based on potential fuel flow from unused 
operational capacity for publicly accessible hydrogen fueling stations and DC fast chargers. ZEV 
infrastructure credits are capped at 5% of the prior quarter’s deficit generation—2.5% for 
hydrogen fueling and 2.5% for DC fast charging equipment. Applications for ZEV infrastructure 
credits are open through 2025 and are valid for 15 years in the case of hydrogen infrastructure, 
and 5 years in the case of DC fast charging infrastructure. 
On one level, the addition of infrastructure credits represents a major departure from the 
original design of the LCFS as it does not directly subsidize the consumption of a low carbon 
fuel. Rather, the credits subsidize a fixed cost of providing network infrastructure that may 
encourage adoption of EVs, a technology that may in turn use a low carbon fuel. In the same 
way, however, the infrastructure credit can reduce the very effect that LCFS critics have focused 
on as the central flaw in the regulations design: the encouragement of low, but still non-zero 
carbon fuel. While infrastructure credits may spur vehicle adoption, their effect on expanding 
driving miles would be second order. 
At the same time, if the amount of infrastructure credits awarded through the program were 
significant enough to ease compliance, these credits can have the effect of lowering the overall 
LCFS credit price, and therefore reduce even the diluted carbon price effect on end-use fuel 
prices. The magnitude of any price-suppression effect would depend upon both the quantity of 
infrastructure credits and the slope of the LCFS compliance cost curve. 
2.2 Cost Containment 
Initially, there were no formal limits on how high LCFS credit prices could rise, although legal 
challenges to the regulation effectively delayed implementation, freezing the standard from 
2013 through 2015, and effectively limited demand for credits and their pass-through to fuel 
prices. However, as the lawsuits were resolved in favor of continued implementation of the 
LCFS and the standard declined steadily in the last several years (with the exception of a court-
ruled hiatus for the diesel pool standard in 2017-2018, which resumed its trajectory in 2019), 
credit prices have risen steadily and raised increasing concerns about the cost of the 
regulation.9 In its 2015 re-adoption rule, CARB introduced the credit clearance market, which is 
a cost-containment mechanism that would in theory limit price increases under some 
scenarios. 
Entities in need of LCFS credits for purposes of immediate compliance can purchase credits in 
the credit clearance market at a price no higher than the prescribed maximum of $200 per ton 
 
9 Historical LCFS credit prices can be accessed via the Data Dashboard at the ARB website: https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/ 
fuels/lcfs/dashboard/dashboard.htm. 
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in 2016 and adjusted for inflation thereafter (currently $216 per ton). If these entities are 
unable to purchase sufficient credits in this market to reach compliance, then they may carry 
over their deficits to future periods. Carryover deficits grow by 5% per year, meaning that firms 
pay an ‘interest’ penalty for deferring compliance. However, firms that hold credits are not 
required to sell in the credit clearance market, and they would not do so if they believed that 
they may be able to sell their credits at a higher price in the future. Thus, the credit clearance 
market provides only a soft cap. However, CARB is currently proposing to impose a hard price 
cap of $200 per ton in 2016 dollars for LCFS credit transactions. To help facilitate compliance 
under this cap, it proposes a mechanism to ‘borrow credits’ from future residential EV charging. 
Under this mechanism, obligated entities could use credits expected to be generated in 2026-
2030 to meet unmet annual deficit obligations in 2020–2025. 
These cost-containment mechanisms are suited for dealing with a transient disruption in clean 
fuel supply or some other cause of a short-term supply-demand imbalance of LCFS credits. 
Because of the requirement that borrowed credits be restored with interest, it will not be 
effective at containing costs in an environment of chronic, long-term credit supply-demand 
imbalance. The future prospects of the regulation are therefore linked to the potential supply 
and demand balance through the next 11 years of the program. A circumstance where 
compliance is only feasible through high cost fuels or sharp reductions in fuel consumption 
would push credit prices above the maximum credit price for the credit clearance market. One 
objective of this paper is to assess the potential likelihood of such an outcome. In 2019, CARB 
proposed amendments that would backstop this cost containment mechanism, enforcing 
additional borrowing of future credit generation from residential electricity charging for EVs at 
the maximum credit price, with a rolling payback schedule enforced on utilities that will borrow 
the credits, up to a cumulative total of 10 million borrowed credits. 
3. Data and Methodology 
This section outlines data and methods used to project business-as-usual (BAU) for LCFS credit 
and deficit generation to 2030. In this paper we use the term business-as-usual (BAU) 
frequently, and take it to mean, regarding LCFS credit demand, the continuation of historical 
trends through the compliance period. For LCFS credit supply, BAU refers to a continuation of 
current alternative fuel mix trends to 2030. Therefore, the uncertainty in the projections stems 
from the estimation of BAU demand, which against an assumed steady state of supply, yields a 
distribution of net deficits accumulate over the period 2019 to 2030, on which we base 
subsequent analysis. 
3.1 Model of BAU Demand 
We are interested forecasting demand for fuel and vehicle miles under BAU economic 
conditions. Demand for fuel and vehicle miles are highly dependent on other economic 
variables. Demand for both fuel and vehicle miles will be influenced by general economic 
activity and oil prices. In a booming economy, consumers travel more and purchase more fuel. 
Our aim is to fit an econometric model that characterizes past trends in key credit demand 
variables, such as fuel consumption, and key input prices for the gasoline and diesel fuel 
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“pools,” namely oil price and soybean prices, vehicle miles traveled, and an indicator of the 
state economy.10 The estimates from that model are then used to simulate relationships 
moving forward to project potential credit demand. 
Let 𝑋𝑡 = (𝑋1𝑡 , 𝑋2𝑡 , . . . , 𝑋6𝑡)′
 denote the vector composed of the six variables included in our 
model used to characterize the BAU environment, where 𝑡 is at the quarterly level. The six 
components of 𝑋𝑡  are 
𝑋1𝑡 = California Reformulated Gasoline Consumption 
𝑋2𝑡 = California Diesel Fuel Consumption 
𝑋3𝑡 =  U.S. Soybean Prices 
𝑋4𝑡 = California Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) 
𝑋5𝑡 = Brent Oil Price 
𝑋6𝑡 = California Gross State Product (GSP) 
Define 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑖𝑡) for 𝑖 =  1, . . . ,6 and 𝑌_𝑡 =  (𝑌1𝑡 , 𝑌2𝑡 , . . . , 𝑌6𝑡)′. We fit a cointegrated vector 
error correction (VEC) model to 𝑌𝑖𝑡. Cointegration allows the variables to have one or more 
stable long-run relationships. We specify three cointegration relationships: 
𝑌1𝑡 = 𝛽10 + 𝛽11𝑌4𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑌5𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑌6𝑡 + 𝑧1𝑡 (1) 
𝑌2𝑡 = 𝛽20 + 𝛽21𝑌4𝑡 + 𝛽22𝑌5𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑌6𝑡 + 𝑧2𝑡 (2) 
𝑌3𝑡 = 𝛽30 + 𝛽32𝑌5𝑡 + 𝑧3𝑡 (3) 
The first equation represents the demand for gasoline and the second represents the demand 
for diesel. The third equation implies that soybean and crude oil prices are tied together in the 
long run. We impose zero coefficients on VMT and GSP in the third equation because we have 
no rationale for these California variables to be tied to the soybean price.11 The 𝑧𝑖𝑡  terms 
represent the deviations from the cointegration relationship, also known as the error correction 
terms. 
The VEC model to estimate the interrelationships among the six credit demand variables is: 
 Δ𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼𝑧𝑡−1 + Σ𝑗=1
𝑝−1Γ𝑗Δ𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + Σ𝑘=1
4 ω𝑘𝑠𝑘 + 𝜀𝑡 , (4) 
where Δ is the first-difference operator, 𝑠𝑘  are seasonal indicators for the quarter of the year, 
𝑝 = 4 so that three quarterly lags of 𝑌𝑡 are included in the model, and 𝜀𝑡  is a vector of 
idiosyncratic disturbances. The 6 × 3 matrix 𝛼 represents how the six variables respond to 
 
10 The list includes soybean prices to capture trends in commodity prices. It may also improve the model’s ability to 
project trends in use of biomass-based diesel within the diesel pool. 
11 The purpose of this third equation is to model the marginal cost of producing biomass-based diesel, which can 
then be used to model the LCFS credit price under the assumption that biomass-based diesel is the marginal 
compliance fuel. We do not conduct that analysis in this report; we defer it to future research. 
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deviations from the cointegration relationship. Putting equations 1-3 together with equation 4, 
we can write the model as: 
 Δ𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼𝛽0 + 𝛼𝛽
′𝑌𝑡−1 + Σ𝑗=1
𝑝−1Γ𝑗Δ𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + Σ𝑘=1
4 ω𝑘𝑠𝑘 + 𝜀𝑡  (5) 
where 
𝛽 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
−𝛽11 −𝛽21 0
−𝛽12 −𝛽22 −𝛽32
−𝛽13 −𝛽23 0 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
and 𝛽0 = (−𝛽10,−𝛽20, −𝛽30)′. 
3.2 Data 
We use data available from 1987 to 2018 for the six dependent variables to fit the VEC model. 
Because our data are measured at the quarterly level, we have a total of 124 observations for 
each variable.12 California GSP was collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.13 The oil 
prices used in our model are Europe Brent spot prices FOB collected from the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) at the monthly level and aggregated to quarterly averages.14 
We chose to use Brent oil prices rather than West Texas Intermediate prices because Brent 
prices are more relevant to California markets. Historical vehicle miles traveled (VMT) on 
California highways are reported by the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), at 
the monthly level.15 On-highway VMT data are reported in the aggregate, and not divided into 
gasoline and diesel vehicles.16 Our model also requires soybean prices, which we collect from 
the Agricultural Marketing Service at the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).17 We 
aggregate monthly spot prices in Central Illinois to quarterly averages to be used in the model. 
 
12 All variables are measured at the quarterly level except CA GSP. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) reports 
quarterly data only since the year 2003. Therefore, we use annual data for CA GSP, which is available for the entire 
sample 1987-2018. 
13 Available at https://apps.bea.gov/regional/downloadzip.cfm. 
14 Historical Brent oil prices can be found at https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s= 
RBRTE&f=M. 
15 Available at http://www.dot.ca.gov/trafficops/census/mvmt.html 
16 We divide highway VMT by 0.56 to scale it up to an approximate total VMT. We use a factor of 0.56 because, 
when we compare on-highway VMT from Caltrans to total VMT from EMFAC (EMission FACtors: a model to 
calculate statewide or regional emissions inventories), we find that on-highway VMT make up 56% of total VMT in 
California on average. This re-scaling has no effect on the coefficient estimates or BAU projections from the VEC 
model described in the previous subsection because it is effectively just a change in units for one of the predictor 
variables. We re-scale the variable because later in our analysis when we estimate EV charging loads, we need to 
estimate VMT coming from EVs, which means we need total VMT rather than on-highway VMT. 
17 The soybean prices used in this study can be accessed by creating a custom report in the Market News Portal at 
https://www.ams.usda.gov/market-news/custom-reports and querying Central Illinois soybean under grains. 
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The main variables of interest in our model are gasoline and diesel consumption and VMT in 
California as we need to forecast BAU fuel demand in order to construct a distribution of LCFS 
deficits. We collect monthly prime supplier sales volumes for California reformulated gasoline 
(CaRFG) from the EIA.18 This measure captures all finished gasoline that is consumed in 
California, including imports to the state. We assume all gasoline is consumed in the 
transportation sector. 
Measuring diesel fuel consumption is more nuanced. The EIA reports monthly sales volumes for 
refiners at each step in the supply chain. We aggregate wholesale and retail sales volumes for 
No.2 distillate to construct a measure of consumption of No.2 distillate. According to data from 
the EIA, 99% of No.2 distillate is used for diesel fuel in California. Therefore, we calculate sales 
volumes of CARB diesel, which is ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD) sold in California, as 99% of No.2 
distillate sales. The diesel pool, however, comprises biomass-based diesel (BBD), which includes 
biodiesel and renewable diesel, as well as petroleum diesel. BBD demand was negligible prior to 
2011 but has been increasing in the years since. Therefore, we construct the measure for diesel 
fuel consumption as the sum of BBD and ULSD. The EIA does not report sales of BBD, so we use 
volumes reported by CARB in the LCFS quarterly summary, since the years of substantial BBD 
demand occur in that time period.19 We aggregate monthly CARB diesel sales from the EIA to 
quarterly totals and add quarterly volumes of BBD from CARB. 
The LCFS regulates fuel used in the California transportation sector. Therefore, to accurately 
estimate the number of deficits generated from CARB diesel using our data, we need to 
measure the amount of diesel fuel consumed in California that is allocated to the 
transportation sector. Since 1992, approximately 70% of distillate consumed in California has 
been used on-highway in the transportation sector.20 We therefore make the assumption, in 
accordance with our definition of BAU, that 70% of all CARB diesel will be consumed in the 
transportation sector in each year over the 2019-2030 compliance period. We are unaware of 
information that would lead us to believe a divergence from this long term could occur and we 
do not consider altering this assumption in this study. Importantly, scaling diesel by a constant 
has no effect on the coefficient estimates in the VEC model that we use to generate our BAU 
simulations. 
3.3 Coefficient Estimates from the VEC Model 
The long-run coefficient estimates from the VEC cointegration model appear in Table 1. 
Collectively, the coefficient estimates presented here make up the ?̂? matrix, therefore 
characterizing the long-run, cointegrating relationships between the variables in our model 
using 1987–2018 data. The three columns in Table 1 correspond to the three cointegrating 
 
18 The EIA classifies a prime supplier as “a firm that produces, imports, or transports selected petroleum products 
across State boundaries and local marketing areas, and sells the product to local distributors, local retailers, or end 
users.” 
19 The LCFS quarterly summary can be accessed at https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/lrtqsummaries.htm. 
20 Historical distillate sales in California by end-use sector can be accessed at https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/ 
pet_cons_821usea_dcu_nus_a.htm  
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equations specified in equations 1, 2, and 3, and the rows, to their long-run relationships with 
GSP, VMT, and the oil price. 
Table 1. Long-Run Coefficient Estimates of the Co-Integrating Equations 
 ln(CaRFG) ln(Diesel) ln(Soybean 
Price) 
ln(VMT) -0.360*** -0.539 0 
 (0.0740) (0.521) (0) 
ln(Oil Price) 0.0318 -0.359*** -0.250 
 (0.0188) (0.0875) (0.247) 
ln(GSP) 0.164*** 1.024*** 0 
 (0.0449) (0.316) (0) 
Constant 21.93 9.153 3.491 
Observations 123 123 123 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
In the first two equations (columns) of Table 1, gasoline and diesel demand in California, the 
coefficients on the oil price capture the price responsiveness of demand for each fuel. The 
elasticity for diesel is larger in magnitude and has the expected sign. The elasticity for gasoline, 
on the other hand, is positive but small, and statistically insignificant at the 5% level. This may 
reflect the fact that gasoline demand is very inelastic. The coefficients on GSP reflect the 
income effect. Gasoline and diesel fuel are normal goods and thus should be expected to be 
positively correlated with income in the state. The coefficient on VMT captures fuel economy 
improvements as more VMT per gallon implies fewer gallons. Because the VMT measure is not 
reported by vehicle type, implied fuel efficiency gains in each of the two fuel pools are not 
discernible. In the next section, we use the long-run coefficient estimates from Table 1, along 
with the short-run estimates located in the appendix in Table 5 and random shocks, to project a 
range of forecasts for gasoline, diesel, and vehicle miles demand out to 2030. 
3.4 BAU Demand Simulations 
We use the coefficient estimates from the VEC model to predict the distribution for each 
variable through the compliance period, 2019–2030. Specifically, we simulate 1000 potential 
values for each variable in each quarter during the compliance period. To this end, we assume 
that the potential shocks 𝜀𝑡  that may occur in the compliance period have the same distribution 
as the shocks during our estimation sample period, 1987–2018. Using this assumption, we 
simulate potential future shocks by sampling randomly with replacement from the 1987–2018 
shocks. For each random draw, we use the VEC model to generate a hypothetical path for the 
six variables. We repeat this exercise 1000 times to give a distribution of potential paths. 
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Specifically, for each simulation 𝑘 = 1,2, . . . ,1000, we generate hypothetical future values for 
the six variables by iterating on the following equation for 𝑡 from 2019 through 2030: 
?̂?𝑘𝑡 = ?̂?𝑘,𝑡−1  +  ?̂??̂?0  +  ?̂??̂?
′?̂?𝑘,𝑡−1 + Σ𝑗=1
𝑝−1Γ̂𝑗Δ?̂?𝑘,𝑡−𝑗 + Σ𝑘=1
4 ω̂𝑘𝑠𝑘 + 𝜀?̂?𝑡
∗  , (6) 
where 𝜀?̂?𝑡
∗  is the 𝑘𝑡ℎ  random draw from the estimation-sample residuals. For observations in 
the sample period, we use 𝑌𝑘𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡  and 𝜀?̂?𝑡
∗ = 𝜀?̂? , which means that the simulation replicates 
observed data until the end of 2018 and then simulates a hypothetical path after 2018. We 
back out the projected levels of each variable for each simulation 𝑘 as ?̂?𝑖𝑘𝑡 = exp (?̂?𝑖𝑘𝑡) for 𝑖 =
1,2,… ,6. 
The hypothetical paths for blended gasoline, diesel, and VMT, simulated using equation 6, are 
described in Figure 1 with the median draw from each year (solid line) and a 90% pointwise 
confidence interval (dashed lines).21 In addition to those variables, we calculate the fuel 
economy of gasoline vehicles that is implied under BAU conditions. To do so, we multiply each 
VMT projection by the percent estimated in CARB’s EMFAC (Emissions FACtors) model to come 
from gasoline-powered vehicles (approximately 90%).22 Then we can express the average fuel 
economy, measured in miles per gallon (MPG), for gasoline vehicles by dividing gasoline VMT in 
each draw by the number of gallons of CaRFG. The implied fuel economy shown in Figure 1 
highlights the range of efficiency gains considered in our simulations over the compliance 
period. This implied gasoline vehicle economy, derived from EMFAC percentages combined 
with our projections, is a fleet-wide average for gasoline powered vehicles only, and does not 
explicitly build in the recent California vehicle efficiency agreement with major automakers to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions per mile for model years 2022 through 2026.23 
For each variable in our VEC model, the level of uncertainty grows as we move further into the 
future. In Figure 1, 90% of the draws from our sample fall between 14 and 17 billion gallons of 
CaRFG being consumed in 2030—a 13% decrease and 12% increase, respectively, from current 
levels. By similar calculations, the 90% confidence interval for consumption of diesel falls 
between a 10% reduction and 75% increase from current levels by 2030. The range of 
possibilities for diesel consumption is shown in Figure 1. Lastly, VMT increases above current 
levels in 90% of the draws as shown in Figure 1. VMT has been far less volatile than gasoline 
and diesel consumption in California and therefore we see a tighter range of uncertainty 
around future VMT projections. 
 
21 Plots of GSP, oil prices, and soybean prices can be found in the Appendix A. 
22 Using data from CARB’s EMFAC model, we find that gasoline-powered vehicles make up approximately 90% of 
California VMT, and this is projected to decline slowly over the next decade due to EV penetration. We use this 
projected percentage in each year to find VMT attributable to gasoline vehicles for each draw of our simulations. 
23 See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-emissions/california-four-automakersdefy-trump-agree-to-
tighten-emissions-rules-idUSKCN1UK1OD. 
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Figure 1. Demand Forecasts under BAU Variation 
3.5 BAU Fuel Assumptions for Deficit Generation 
Each gallon of CaRFG contains reformulated blendstock for oxygenate blending (CARBOB) and 
ethanol. Due to the “blend wall” for ethanol, CaRFG, as well as all reformulated gasoline in the 
U.S., is often referred to as E10. The average gallon of ethanol earns LCFS credits since the 
volume-weighted CI rating of ethanol used in the program falls below the standard. Therefore, 
each gallon of CaRFG consumed in California will generate both LCFS deficits and credits. We 
calculate total CARBOB consumption as 90% of CaRFG, with the remaining 10% being ethanol. 
Therefore, the BAU projection assumes that the E10 blend wall persists through 2030. Pursuant 
to our definition of BAU, the currently observed BBD blend rate in the liquid diesel pool persists 
through 2030 as well. That is, we assume that 20% of liquid diesel fuel used in the 
transportation sector is BBD. The BAU projection extends the status quo assumption to fuel CI 
ratings over the compliance period. In the case of the biofuels, recent average volume-
weighted CI ratings reported to the LCFS are used. These assumptions are summarized in Table 
2. 
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Table 2. BAU Assumptions for Deficit-Generating Fuels 
Gasoline Pool  
 Share of Total Fuel CI 
CARBOB 0.90 100.82 
Ethanol 0.10 65 
Diesel Pool  
 Share of Total Fuel CI 
CARB Diesel 0.8 100.45 
Biodiesel 0.05 30 
Renewable Diesel 0.15 34 
The one area where BAU assumptions differ from the status quo is electric vehicles (EVs). We 
have to make an assumption regarding the penetration of EVs to forecast credit generation 
from electricity as well as to forecast the level of fossil fuel displacement. EV penetration is 
difficult to predict and its trends have been evolving. For this reason, we use EMFAC projections 
of the share of all vehicles that are light-duty electric and heavy-duty electric.24 EMFAC projects 
1.3 million EVs on California roads by 2030. Table 3 shows how EMFAC projections translate 
into parameters that measure EV penetration in California now and in 2030; we follow the 
EMFAC rate of penetration in our BAU. Table 3 also shows our BAU assumptions regarding the 
CI rating of electricity. We use the current grid average CI rating and energy economy ratios 
(EERs) reported by CARB. Policies in place to reduce the CI rating of the grid through increased 
use of renewables or accelerate penetration of EVs are not implemented in the BAU but 
considered in alternative scenarios to the BAU and sensitivity analyses on the results. 
 
24 See https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/msei/downloads/emfac2017_users_guide_final.pdf. 
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Table 3. BAU EV Assumptions by Vehicle Type 
    2019 Share of Pop.: 2030 Share of Pop.: 
EV Type CI EER EER-Adj. CI EVs All Vehicles EVs All Vehicles 
LDV 81.49 3.5 23.28 0.95 0.007 0.7 0.025 
HDV 81.49 5 16.30 0.05 0.001 0.3 0.01 
In addition to the assumptions in Table 3, we assume in the BAU that future EVs will replace the 
average internal combustion engine vehicle (ICEV) on the light-duty side but be driven 30 
percent fewer miles, again taking the BAU stance of extending current conditions to 2030 
(Davis 2019). We have no information on how VMT for the heavy-duty sector may change with 
increasing EV penetration. While vehicles deployed may be well used, as currently the case, 
fleets and loads may also shift in unexpected ways. For this exercise, for simplicity, we apply the 
“30% fewer miles” assumption also to heavy-duty EVs and assess the displaced petroleum fuel 
all from the gasoline pool.25 With these assumptions, we can project a quantity of kilowatt-
hours of electricity that will be charged and project the resulting number of LCFS credits 
associated with the demand simulations. Since EVs are assumed to replace average fuel 
economy ICEVS, gasoline demand declines according to the share of EVs in the vehicle pool. 
Specifically, we calculate the number of kilowatt-hours for light-duty EVs according to the 
following equation: 
 𝑘𝑊ℎ𝑡  =  𝑠𝑡  ×  (0.7 ×  𝑋4𝑡) × 0.32 , (7) 
where 𝑠𝑡 is the share of EVs to all vehicles in year 𝑡, 𝑋4𝑡 is vehicle mile demand from the VEC 
model, and the 0.32 scale factor translates miles into kilowatt-hours.26 Then, credits from 
electricity can be calculated by plugging in the number of kilowatt-hours into equation 18. 
Using the parameters from Table 2 and Table 3, we translate the forecasts of fuel demand, after 
accounting for gasoline displacement from EVs, into forecasts of the deficit/credit balance over 
the compliance period subject to BAU conditions. Using the predictions of CaRFG and diesel 
demand, we calculate CARBOB and CARB diesel deficits in each state of the world represented 
by our simulations.27 The distributions of deficits from each fuel are plotted in Figure 2. Figure 
2a shows a distribution of CARBOB deficits centered around 290 MMT on average, or 
approximately 26 MMT per year. For context, the average is approximately 150 percent larger 
than the 10.3 MMT generated in 2018. The increase in deficits reflects the BAU demand 
projections as well as the increasing stringency of the standard to 2030: a gallon of fuel of a 
 
25 These simplifying assumptions do not appreciably impact results given the low assumed HDV penetration levels 
during the period. At higher penetration levels, assumptions about and implementation of HDV fuel displacement 
could be important to volumes of biofuels required for compliance, and the treatment used here for simplicity 
would no longer suffice. 
26 The AFDC reports this: https://afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/electric_emissions_sources.html. 
27 See equation 18 in the Appendix Afor more details. 
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given CI rating generates more deficits in later years because the gap between it and the 
required CI increases due to the annual decrease in the CI standards. 
The total demand for LCFS credits plotted in Figure 3 is the sum of CARBOB and CARB diesel 
deficits, less the bank of system-wide credits accumulated since the beginning of the LCFS, 
reflecting CI rating reductions beyond required annual levels; the bank currently holds 
approximately 8.5 million metric tons (MMT) of credits. This distribution characterizes the 
number of LCFS credits that would need to be supplied to the market to cover aggregate 
deficits expected to be generated under BAU conditions for the period 2019–2030. Note that 
our approach is high-level, examining aggregate net deficits for the compliance period and 
abstracting away from annual compliance decisions and situations that could impact year-to-
year credit availability. 
 
 (a) CARBOB (b) CARB Diesel 
Figure 2. Projected Distributions of BAU Deficits by Fuel 
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Figure 3. Projected Distribution of BAU LCFS Deficits 
Until this point, we have described BAU forecasts for LCFS deficits and for credit generation 
from BBD, ethanol, and on-road electricity. However, there are other pathways to credit 
generation that must be considered before estimating a credit/deficit balance. As shown in 
Figure 4, BBD, ethanol, and on-road electricity make up 90% of the credits that were generated 
in 2018. For the remaining pathways, we assume that credit generation under BAU remains 
constant at 2018 levels. We will consider alternative credit-generating assumptions regarding 
these other pathways in the next section. The other pathways include renewable natural gas—
including from landfills and dairy, off-road electricity, projects such as carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS) and innovative crude production, alternative jet fuel, and hydrogen. We 
use measures of different scenarios laid out by CARB in their illustrative compliance scenario 
calculator (ICS) to quantify these credits. 
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Figure 4. LCFS Credit Generation by Pathway in 2018 (RNG, renewable natural gas) 
We can now combine projected distributions of deficits and credits, some of the latter tied to 
the demand scenarios through blend levels and vehicle penetration rates, and others held 
constant at levels proscribed by CARB in its LCFS ICS, to illustrate the future compliance outlook 
through 2030 under BAU variation. We present these results in Figure 5 by taking slices of the 
distribution according to the percentile of net deficits remaining after BAU assumptions are 
applied. That is, we identify the percentile of each simulation according to the level of net 
deficits in that simulation and plot credits by each pathway in those simulations. Under the 
BAU, Figure 5 shows the scope of under-compliance in the LCFS. The under-compliance result 
under BAU assumptions is not a surprise, since LCFS targets were chosen to mandate 
substantial change in California’s fuels mix, and the BAU freezes several key elements. It does, 
however, show the magnitude of change required for compliance if past trends in fuel 
consumption and the state economy continue. On average across simulations, deficits are 
163.61 MMT greater than credits over the entire compliance period. Figure 3 shows that the 
average number of deficits is about 360 MMT, indicating that our credit supply assumptions 
under a BAU would cover less than half the compliance requirements for the period 2019 to 
2030. 
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Figure 5. Projected LCFS Credit Generation under BAU 
The BAU case depicted in Figure 5 allows infrastructure credits to be generated at their 
maximum potential rate, which is 5% of the previous year’s CARBOB deficits. It is readily 
apparent that infrastructure credits are much too small a source to make a meaningful 
difference in the net deficits, and that the burden of compliance will fall on other sources of 
credit generation. 
4. Compliance Scenarios 
Our projection of deficits under BAU variation provides a range of possibilities of demand for 
LCFS credits. Next, we present compliance scenarios in which we overlay a range of possibilities 
for LCFS credit supply. We begin with a baseline scenario and then consider adjustments to 
each of the baseline assumptions. 
Throughout, we make the assumption that biomass-based diesel will be the marginal fuel for 
compliance under the LCFS. This is the most likely case given past trends, and due to policy and 
capacity constraints inherent with other regulated pathways. Of current credit generators, the 
constraint from the ethanol blend wall is notable. Blends of ethanol up to E85 require a 
specialized vehicle not being prioritized for sales. E15, while allowable nationally, must go 
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through an additional approval process for use within state.28 Massive growth in newer 
technologies such as hydrogen, natural gas, or EVs would require those technologies to have a 
lower cost than the already mature renewable diesel. This may be possible, or additional credit 
generating opportunities may be opened up by regulatory amendments as in the past (e.g., 
recent expansion to book-and-claim for renewable natural gas use upstream in refineries), but 
these situations are too unknown or uncertain to be included here. 
In the previous section, we presented a distribution of credit shortages assuming that BAU 
trends continue on both the demand and supply side. In this section we relax assumptions on 
the supply side and answer the question of how much BBD would be necessary to reach annual 
compliance under the LCFS. We take this approach to evaluating the difficulty of compliance 
because BBD is the marginal fuel for compliance. Therefore, we consider different assumptions 
regarding credit generation and assume the resulting net deficits must be satisfied by BBD 
credits. We assume a smooth drawdown of the existing credit bank going into the study period 
and require annual compliance through use of additional fuels, neither of which is imposed by 
the regulation. Our analysis is meant to illustrate difficulty of compliance. 
4.1 Deriving Implied BBD Blend Rates Required for Compliance 
Deficits from CARBOB and diesel demand in each draw arise directly from the VEC model, as 
described above, and require no additional assumptions. Net deficits from CARBOB are 
calculated as 
 𝑁𝐷𝑡
𝐶 ≡ 𝐷𝑡
𝐶 − 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝑜𝑛 − 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑡 − 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡 − 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑡 − 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑡 , (8) 
where 𝑁𝐷𝑡
𝐶  is equal to CARBOB deficits net of credits from on-road electricity, ethanol, 
infrastructure, the other sources from the ICS, and the bank. We assume the bank is allocated 
equally across the 11-year compliance period. Infrastructure credits are assumed to bind at the 
constraint; they are assumed to equal 5% of the prior quarter’s CARBOB deficits in each quarter 
in each draw. The constraint is described in detail in section A.4 of the appendix. 
The number of credits generated per gallon of ULSD and BBD for each year will depend on the 
reported CI of both fuels, as well as the diesel CI standard in each year. The CI standards for 
both gasoline and diesel are reported in the appendix in Table 7. The next step requires 
additional notation. Define 𝐷𝑡 as demand for diesel fuel in year 𝑡, 𝐵𝑡 as BBD, 𝑈𝑡 as ULSD, 𝑁𝐷𝑡
𝐶  
as net deficits from CARBOB, 𝜓𝑡
𝐵 as the number of credits earned per gallon of BBD, and 𝜓𝑡
𝑈 as 
the number of credits per gallon of ULSD. BBD is the sum of biodiesel and renewable diesel; 
𝐵𝑡 ≡ 𝐵𝐷𝑡 + 𝑅𝐷𝑡 where 𝐵𝐷𝑡 is biodiesel and 𝑅𝐷𝑡 is renewable diesel. The reported CI for CARB 
diesel is currently 100.45 and is expected to remain there until 2030. Therefore, 𝜓𝑡
𝑈 is known 
for all t. In contrast, the future of reported CIs of BBD is uncertain and will depend on a few 
different factors. 
 
28 See https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/12295-market-demand-for-e15-looks-to-bemodest. 
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The CI ratings of both biodiesel and renewable diesel are highly dependent on the feedstock. 
Waste oils and animal fats are rated as having relatively low life-cycle emissions and thus are 
rated with a very low CI. Used cooking oil and tallow currently generate the lion’s share of LCFS 
credits from BBD. However, it is plausible that used cooking oil and tallow will experience 
supply shortages due to capacity constraints under a rapidly growing demand for BBD over the 
next decade. Soybean oil, on the other hand, is much more scalable and could more easily meet 
high demand for BBD. Soybean oil, however, has a considerably higher CI rating due to its 
impact on land use emissions, which would make lower credit generation from a given volume 
of BBD. Given the uncertainty around the CI ratings of BBD, we consider different assumptions 
around their time paths. 
Conditional on the CI ratings used for BBD (𝜓𝑡
𝐵), we can solve the following system of two 
equations for the two unknowns, 𝐵𝑡 and 𝑈𝑡 for 𝑡 = 2019,… ,2030. 
 𝐷𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡 + 𝑈𝑡  (9) 
 𝑁𝐷𝑡
𝐶  =  𝜓𝑡
𝑏𝐵𝑡  +  𝜓𝑡
𝑈  𝑈𝑡 (10) 
Using simple algebra, the quantities of 𝐵𝑡 and 𝑈𝑡 that satisfy the system of equations are: 
 𝑈𝑡
∗ = 
𝐷𝑡− 
𝑁𝐷𝑡
𝐶
𝜓𝑡
𝐵
1−
𝜓𝑡
𝑈
𝜓𝑡
𝐵
 (11) 
 𝐵𝑡
∗ = 
𝐷𝑡− 
𝑁𝐷𝑡
𝐶
𝜓𝑡
𝑈
1−
𝜓𝑡
𝐵
𝜓𝑡
𝑈
  (12) 
Using equations 11 and 12, we can calculate the diesel pool blend rate that would be required 
for compliance under each of our scenarios accordingly: 
 𝐵𝑅𝑡
∗ =  
𝐵𝑡
∗
𝐵𝑡
∗+𝑈𝑡
∗ (13) 
4.2 Scenario Assumptions 
Certain elements of credit supply are tied to demand, whereas we assume others are 
independent of demand. We calculate the factors that depend on demand from output of the 
VEC model and the simulations. Ethanol volumes in each simulation, for example, are equal to 
10 percent of gasoline demand so we calculate the volume of ethanol for each draw of the 
simulations. 
For the factors that are separate from demand, we run our simulation using different policy and 
supply scenarios to understand their impact. To characterize the relative influence of different 
assumptions, we evaluate each scenario against a baseline. In the baseline scenario, we assume 
all CI ratings remain at 2018 levels, infrastructure credits are maximized, and the other credit 
generating categories achieve the minimum values in the ICS. In Table 4 we summarize each 
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scenario and its assumptions, relative to the BAU assumptions in the previous section and the 
baseline compliance scenario. In all scenarios, we assume that infrastructure credits are at the 
maximum allowable level of 5% of the previous year’s CARBOB deficits. 
The other credits we use from CARB’s ICS are independent of our model of demand for LCFS 
credits. They are developed within the ARB modeling system, based on demand scenarios, and 
policy and credit pricing assumptions (of a steady level around $125) out to 2030.29 To illustrate 
the magnitude in which these sources could affect BBD demand and LCFS compliance, we 
consider a scenario in which the maximum of each source across scenarios is realized. 
Specifically, we take the maximum number of credits across the ICS scenarios in each year for 
each pathway. This set of assumptions is A1 in Table 4. This characterizes a scenario with a 
higher credit profile for renewable natural gas and projects. 
We consider a scenario in which the number of EVs rises sharply over the compliance period. In 
2018, California Governor Jerry Brown announced a $2.5 billion plan with the objective of 
getting 1.5 million ZEVs on California roads by 2025 and 5 million by 2030.30 This trajectory 
would be a stark deviation from any historical trends and would not be captured in our model 
of BAU fuel demand. Therefore, we consider a scenario in which 1.5 million EVs are on the road 
by 2025 and increase at a constant rate to 5 million by 2030. We refer to this set of 
assumptions as A2 in Table 4. 
Table 4. Summary of Compliance Scenario Assumptions 
Label Compliance 
Scenario 
EV 
Population 
Ethanol 
CI 
BBD 
CI 
ICS 
Credits 
BAU - 1.3M by 2030 65 32 2018 levels 
A0 Baseline 1.3M by 2030 65 32 Min 
A1 Max ICS Credits 1.3M by 2030 65 32 Max 
A2 Jerry Brown’s 
ZEV Goal 
1.5M by 2025; 
5M by 2030 
65 32 Min 
A3 Dec. Ethanol CI 1.3M by 2030 65 → 40 32 Min 
A4 Inc. BBD CI 1.3M by 2030 65 32 → 50 Min 
The CI rating of ethanol is also independent of demand. The future path of the CI value for 
ethanol will depend on technology development and adoption. CARB, in the ICS, assumes a 
path for starch, sugar, and cellulosic ethanol in which the volume-weighted average CI rating of 
ethanol falls to 40 by 2030, a 38.5% reduction from the current level.31 This CI reduction stems 
from assumed industry-wide adoption of CCS as well as increases in volumes of sugar ethanol in 
the near future and cellulosic ethanol toward the end of the decade. Therefore, we consider a 
 
29 We do not explicitly model credit price, but extrapolate from trends visible under historical credit pricing. 
30 See https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/california-gov-jerry-brown-unveils-25billion-plan-to-boost-
electric-vehicles/2018/01/27/deed8cd8-039f-11e8-8acf-ad2991367d9dstory.html. 
31 The specific path for the ethanol CI rating assumed in the ICS can be found in Figure 10 in the Appendix. 
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scenario in which the ICS CI projections are realized. We refer to these set of assumptions as A3 
in Table 4. 
In addition to ethanol, the future path of the CI value for BBD is uncertain, as previously 
mentioned. We consider a scenario in which the volume-weighted average CI rating of BBD 
rises from its current level of approximately 32 to 50, a rating more commensurate with 
soybean oil feedstocks. This represents a future in which soybean oil makes up the majority of 
the BBD feedstock pool, to provide a bound of uncertainty in this parameter. This is assumption 
A4 in Table 4. 
Beyond the four scenarios presented in this paper, we considered adjusting other assumptions 
in our analysis. None had a qualitatively different impact on the implied BBD blend rate results. 
For example, a scenario where a cleaner electricity grid is achieved, resulting in a grid-average 
CI reduction for electricity, as would occur as renewables’ penetration continues, did not 
substantially impact results. Even a zero CI rating for electricity over the compliance period had 
only small impacts on the implied BBD blend rate required for compliance. CI rating 
improvements for electricity are diluted relative to those for other fuels due to the relative 
efficiency of electricity, measured by the EER. Similarly, additional penetration of biogas—with 
a substantial negative CI rating due to methane capture—into the natural gas used as a 
transport fuel did not have a large impact. Other potential scenarios that may be salient to LCFS 
compliance, such as expanded use of book-and-claim for low-CI rated electricity and biogas 
elsewhere in the production process, are left to future research. 
4.3 Scenario Results 
Here we present the output from four different compliance scenarios and discuss their 
differences from the baseline. In each scenario, we calculate the volume of CARB diesel, BBD, 
and the resulting implied blend rate of BBD in the diesel pool using equations 11, 12, and 13, 
respectively. Figure 6 shows the implied blend rate resulting from the baseline scenario and 
Figure 7 shows the blend rate under the alternative scenarios. For brevity, we present only the 
implied blend rates here, but the volumes of BBD and CARB diesel resulting from each scenario 
can be found in the appendix, Figure 9. 
Because we force annual compliance, the annual quantities of BBD and ULSD, and the implied 
BBD blend rates, in the figures are conditional on compliance in the previous year. Due to the 
decreasing CI standards, shown in Table 7, this characteristic has important implications for 
interpretation of our results; all else equal, BBD production shifted from one year to the next 
will earn fewer credits since the CI rating will be closer in magnitude to the standard, and the 
yet-to-be displaced diesel would earn more deficits as its CI rating falls farther above the 
standard. Therefore, if the path of any of the blend rates pictured in this section were not met 
in early years, the implied blend rate required for compliance in later years would rise 
disproportionately more. In that sense, all of our scenarios depict a lower-bound of BBD implied 
blend rates needed for overall compliance over the 11-year span. The annual compliance 
constraint also abstracts away from real-world optimization decisions on credit banking and 
deficit carryover. We did not model a proposed provision for credit borrowing. 
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Figure 6 shows that, under the baseline scenario, the median outcome calls for an increase in 
the BBD blend rate from the 2018 level of 17% to 70% in 2030. In nominal terms, given our 
demand projections, this outcome implies ramping up BBD consumption in the state to 3.5 
billion gallons in 2030, nearly a 300% increase from current levels, and a reduction in CARB 
diesel consumption to 1.7 billion gallons in 2030, more than a 50% reduction below current 
levels. 
Our median baseline scenario results in a BBD blend rate in diesel fuel similar to the high 
demand/low EV scenario in CARB’s ICS, which is the highest among their four scenarios. Shown 
by the dashed lines in Figure 6, 90% of the blend rates from our simulations fall between 60% 
and 80% BBD in 2030. Next, we alter our baseline assumptions one by one and observe how the 
implied blend rate required for annual compliance changes. 
Figure 7 shows that allowing for the largest number of credits from the other sources in the ICS 
(see discussion above for context on CARB’s modeling assumptions in the ICS) in each year 
would result in a blend rate of 50% BBD, rather than 60%, for the median draw from the 
simulations. Thus, the range of possibilities for the other pathways makes only a small 
difference to the BBD required to meet the standard. Thus, although pathways such as 
renewable natural gas, off-road electricity, CCS and innovative crude production at refineries, 
alternative jet fuel, and hydrogen receive significant attention in LCFS policy discussions, their 
influence on compliance scenarios is relatively minor, as considered in the CARB scoping plan 
model. 
 
Figure 6. Projected Baseline Implied Blend Rate 
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Figure 7. Projected Implied Blend Rates under Compliance Scenarios Plan Modeling. 
In contrast, rapid EV growth has the potential to reduce the blend rate below 25% in 2030, as 
shown in Figure 7. This is by far the largest reduction from the baseline in any of our scenarios, 
and it is the only scenario that projects compliance without dramatic changes in the diesel pool. 
The median required BBD blend in 2030 is approximately 20%, and the 90% confidence interval 
ranges from 12% to 27%. 
Scenarios A3 and A4 move the difficulty of compliance in opposite directions. A declining 
ethanol CI rating, due to CCS and increases in cellulosic and sugar ethanol volumes, would 
reduce the pressure on BBD production. Figure 7 shows that the median draw would have a 
BBD blend rate of approximately 45%, compared to 60% in the baseline. The lower bound of 
the 90% confidence interval is 37%, which is double the current BBD blend rate. 
On the other hand, if the CI rating for BBD were to increase due to insufficient availability of 
low-CI feedstocks such as used cooking oil and a corresponding shift towards soybean oil, then 
the median BBD blend rate would need to rise to 90% in 2030 to achieve compliance, as shown 
in Figure 7. The upper bound of the 90% confidence interval exceeds one, which means that 
compliance would not be achieved even if every on-road diesel gallon was 100% BBD. We have 
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no reason to believe that one of A3 and A4 is more likely than the other. These two scenarios 
can be viewed as a widening of the baseline confidence interval to include possibilities that are 
both more optimistic and more pessimistic for compliance.32 
5. Conclusions 
The California LCFS sets out to achieve a 20% reduction in carbon intensity (CI) in the state’s 
transportation sector below 2011 levels by 2030. Reaching the standard will require dramatic 
changes in the fuel mix in California, but the relative push needed from individual fuel sources 
is uncertain and will depend upon both demand and supply factors over the next decade. One 
of the most critical aspects of understanding compliance is future demand for fuel; the demand 
for LCFS credits will be explicitly tied to consumption of gasoline and diesel fuel in the state. 
Therefore, we estimate a distribution of fuel demand under business-as-usual (BAU) variation, 
i.e., the continuation of historic trends, in order to estimate a distribution of demand for LCFS 
credits over the 2019–2030 compliance period. We estimate that gasoline and diesel will 
generate between 320 and 410 million metric tons (MMT) of deficits in the LCFS program over 
the 11-year period. In 2018, a total of 11.2 MMT credits were generated. For context, if the 
lower-bound of the distribution of credit demand were realized, the market would need to 
supply 29 MMT credits per year on average, nearly a 170% increase from 2018 levels. State 
policies such as those targeting VMT and efficiency standards represent a separate source of 
demand uncertainty, although the BAU variation embraces a wide range of potential 
trajectories for each measure. 
On the credit supply side, uncertainty surrounding compliance stems from the unknown future 
market penetration of alternatives to the internal combustion engine, such as EVs, as well as 
uncertainty around adoption of technologies such as carbon capture and sequestration (CCS). 
We assume the marginal compliance fuel in the LCFS is biomass-based diesel (BBD) and we 
show that BBD’s role in compliance could vary widely depending on, in addition to BAU demand 
conditions, the pace of EV adoption in the state. The adoption of CCS and other CI-reducing 
technologies and the market for feedstocks used to produce BBD also could have significant 
effects. 
In our baseline scenario for credit generation, LCFS compliance would require that between 
60% and 80% of the diesel pool be produced from biomass. Our baseline projections have the 
number of EVs reaching 1.3 million by 2030, however if the number of EVs increases more 
rapidly than what is captured under BAU conditions and reaches Governor Jerry Brown’s goal of 
5 million vehicles by 2030, then LCFS compliance would require substantially less biomass-
based diesel. Under this scenario, annual compliance could be achieved with between 10% and 
 
32 In the current LCFS structure, BBD credit generation beyond the on-road diesel pool is allowed for alternative jet 
fuel, of which a type derived in a similar manner to on-road RD is commercially available. We do not explicitly 
model use of RD in on-road or jet applications, or other credit generation possibilities in the program that could 
drive the implied BBD blend rate lower. 
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25% biomass-based diesel in the diesel pool, which is commensurate with recent levels and 
could be achievable with an indexed $200 credit price through 2030. 
Outside of rapid ZEV penetration, hitting 2030 targets with the $200 credit price may be much 
more difficult. For instance, a scenario in which CCS is widely adopted in ethanol plants would 
bring the median BBD blend rate down to approximately 45% BBD in 2030, rather than 60%. 
However, a 45% blend rate in 2030 under this scenario still results in nearly a 125% increase 
from current levels. Additionally, if increasing BBD production calls for an increasing level of 
higher-CI feedstocks, the implied blend rate required for compliance could increase above the 
baseline. If the volume-weighted average CI rating of BBD were to increase to 50, the median 
draw requires nearly 100% of diesel to be biomass-based. 
Since 2016, CARB has expanded credit generation opportunities in the program, and some 
opportunities are relatively new. The pathways as modeled in the ICS make little appreciable 
qualitative difference to results. This study provides a range of the magnitude of credit 
generation, under uncertainty, that such expanded opportunities would need to provide to 
appreciably change the compliance outlook from one more to one less reliant on cost 
containment mechanisms. 
New mechanisms to allow firms to generate credits by building EV charging stations or 
hydrogen fueling stations have minor implications for overall compliance. This mechanism 
represents a major departure from the original design of the LCFS as it does not directly 
subsidize the consumption of a low carbon fuel. Rather, the credits subsidize a fixed cost of 
providing network infrastructure that may encourage adoption of EVs, the technology which 
may in turn use a low carbon fuel. In the same way, however, the infrastructure credits can 
reduce the very effect that LCFS critics have focused on as the central flaw in the regulations 
design: the encouragement of low, but still non-zero, carbon fuel. Nonetheless, because the 
total quantity of infrastructure credits is restricted to be relatively small, their effect on 
potential compliance scenarios is small.  
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Appendix A 
This appendix contains figures, tables, and equations that are referenced in the text and may be 
relevant to the reader. 
A.1 Additional Output from Simulations and the VEC Model 
The estimates of the 𝛽 and Γ matrices from the VEC model in equation 5 appear in Table 5. 
Table 5. Short-Run Coefficient Estimates from VEC Model 
 ∆Y1t ∆Y2t ∆Y3t ∆Y4t ∆Y5t ∆Y6t 
 Panel A: Estimates of 𝜶 Matrix 
Y1,t−1 -0.0510 0.298 -0.00667 -0.451*** 2.411** -0.0763 
 (0.0432) (0.323) (0.660) (0.0736) (0.990) (0.102) 
Y2,t−1 -0.0144* -0.0810 0.351*** -0.0287** -0.397** -0.0380* 
 (0.00835) (0.0625) (0.128) (0.0142) (0.192) (0.0198) 
Y3,t−1 0.000911 0.0604* -0.161** -0.0251*** 0.220** 0.00565 
 (0.00417) (0.0312) (0.0637) (0.00710) (0.0956) (0.00989) 
 Panel B: Estimates of 𝚪 Matrix 
∆Y1,t−1 -0.275** -0.0759 -0.129 0.600*** 0.589 0.260 
 (0.108) (0.807) (1.648) (0.184) (2.474) (0.256) 
∆Y1,t−2 -0.0544 0.0761 0.400 0.572*** 2.242 0.313 
 (0.104) (0.775) (1.583) (0.177) (2.377) (0.246) 
∆Y1,t−3 -0.0796 -0.286 -1.608 0.508*** -1.984 -0.365 
 (0.0989) (0.740) (1.512) (0.169) (2.269) (0.235) 
∆Y2,t−1 3.73e-05 -0.727*** -0.212 0.0279 0.00140 0.0619* 
 (0.0146) (0.109) (0.223) (0.0249) (0.335) (0.0347) 
∆Y2,t−2 0.00945 -0.440*** -0.00404 0.0434 0.155 0.0465 
 (0.0160) (0.119) (0.244) (0.0272) (0.366) (0.0379) 
∆Y2,t−3 0.00852 -0.115 -0.225 0.0307 0.184 0.0193 
 (0.0132) (0.0990) (0.202) (0.0226) (0.303) (0.0314) 
∆Y3,t−1 -0.00969 -0.0905* 0.433*** 0.00728 0.0205 0.00417 
 (0.00691) (0.0517) (0.106) (0.0118) (0.159) (0.0164) 
∆Y3,t−2 -0.0171** -0.00126 -0.0565 0.0178 0.166 -0.0261 
 (0.00712) (0.0533) (0.109) (0.0121) (0.163) (0.0169) 
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 ∆Y1t ∆Y2t ∆Y3t ∆Y4t ∆Y5t ∆Y6t 
∆Y3,t−3 0.00353 0.0540 -0.0261 0.0187 -0.280* 0.00215 
 (0.00709) (0.0531) (0.108) (0.0121) (0.163) (0.0168) 
∆Y4,t−1 0.0454 0.339 0.533 -0.374*** 0.756 -0.0233 
 (0.0482) (0.361) (0.737) (0.0822) (1.106) (0.114) 
∆Y4,t−2 0.0492 0.741** -0.639 -0.430*** 0.263 -0.124 
 (0.0490) (0.366) (0.748) (0.0835) (1.123) (0.116) 
∆Y4,t−3 0.0350 0.116 -0.854 -0.451*** -0.259 -0.0532 
 (0.0483) (0.362) (0.738) (0.0824) (1.108) (0.115) 
∆Y5,t−1 -0.00528 0.0308 -0.0714 -0.0117 0.227** 0.0236** 
 (0.00439) (0.0328) (0.0670) (0.00748) (0.101) (0.0104) 
∆Y5,t−2 0.0136*** 0.0475 -0.0745 -0.00220 -0.0388 0.0111 
 (0.00445) (0.0333) (0.0680) (0.00759) (0.102) (0.0106) 
∆Y5,t−3 5.75e-06 0.00899 -0.0414 -0.00743 0.174 -0.00728 
 (0.00461) (0.0345) (0.0705) (0.00786) (0.106) (0.0109) 
∆Y6,t−1 -0.0764* -0.162 0.653 -0.0152 -1.834* -0.114 
 (0.0460) (0.345) (0.704) (0.0785) (1.056) (0.109) 
∆Y6,t−2 -0.00840 -0.214 -0.238 0.0405 0.263 0.0147 
 (0.0463) (0.346) (0.707) (0.0789) (1.062) (0.110) 
∆Y6,t−3 0.0281 0.258 1.375** -0.00511 0.859 -0.0175 
 (0.0434) (0.325) (0.664) (0.0740) (0.996) (0.103) 
Constant -0.0152** -0.0985** -0.0270 -0.0525*** 0.00160 -0.0105 
 (0.00620) (0.0464) (0.0947) (0.0106) (0.142) (0.0147) 
Observations 123 123 123 123 123 123 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In Table 6 we summarize the distribution of demand forecasts coming out of the simulations 
over the compliance period. Total VMT, diesel, and gasoline demand forecasts are aggregated 
over the 2019–2030 timeframe for each draw. 
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Table 6. Summary Statistics for Aggregate BAU Demand across Random Samples 
Variables N Mean SD Min Max 
VMT (Billion mi.) 1000 14310.25 141.664 13734.2 14763.78 
Diesel (Billion gal.) 1000 152.666 6.403 133.186 173.577 
CaRFG (Billion gal.) 1000 669.158 6.889 649.944 696.943 
A.2 LCFS Credit Implementation Details 
In this subsection of the appendix, we provide details regarding how credits are generated 
under the LCFS. To illustrate how quantities of fuel translate into credits or deficits, we adopt 
the notation of the LCFS regulation and define the following terms. 
• 𝐼 is the set of credit-generating fuels. 
• 𝑋𝐷 ∈ {𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒, 𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙} represents the fuel being displaced. 
• 𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖
𝑋𝐷the dimensionless Energy Economy Ratio (EER) of fuel 𝑖 relative to gasoline or 
diesel. The EER is fuel and vehicle specific. 
• 𝐸𝐷𝑖 is the energy density of fuel 𝑖. 
• 𝐶𝐼𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑,𝑡
𝑋𝐷  is the CI requirement for fuel XD in the year of quarter 𝑡. The standard for 
each year is presented in Table 7 
• 𝐶𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑡
𝑋𝐷  is the EER-adjusted CI for fuel 𝑖, displacing fuel XD in quarter 𝑡.  
• 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑡
𝑋𝐷  is the total amount of fuel energy for fuel XD that is displaced by alternative 
fuel 𝑖 in quarter 𝑡. 
• 𝐸_𝑖𝑡 is the quantity of energy of fuel 𝑖 in quarter 𝑡. 
• 𝑄_𝑖𝑡 is the quantity of fuel 𝑖 used in quarter 𝑡. 
• 𝐶 =  1 ×  10−6
𝑀𝑇
𝑔𝐶𝑂2𝑒
  converts credits into metric tons. 
Let i ∈I denote the fuel type (i.e., 𝑖= biodiesel, ethanol, electricity, etc.). LCFS credits or deficits 
for each fuel or blendstock for which a fuel reporting entity is the credit or deficit generator will 
be calculated according to the following equation in quarter 𝑡. 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑋𝐷
 (𝑀𝑇) = (𝐶𝐼𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑,𝑡
𝑋𝐷 & −  𝐶𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑡
𝑋𝐷 ) × 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑡
𝑋𝐷 × 𝐶 (14) 
where 
𝐶𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑡
𝑋𝐷 =
𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖
𝑋𝐷   (15) 
and 
𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑡
𝑋𝐷 = 𝐸𝑖𝑡 ×  𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖
𝑋𝐷  (16) 
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and 
𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  𝐸𝐷𝑖  × 𝑄𝑖𝑡  (17) 
Substituting equations 15, 16, and 17 into equation 14, we can then express credits as: 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑋𝐷(𝑀𝑇) = (𝐶𝐼𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑,𝑡
𝑋𝐷 −
𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖
𝑋𝐷) × 𝐸𝐷𝑖 × 𝑄𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖
𝑋𝐷 × 𝐶 (18) 
Aggregating fuels and quarters over the compliance period, the total quantity of credits 
supplied over the compliance period will be 
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑆 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠 = Σ𝑖∈𝐼Σ𝑡=0
𝑇 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 
𝑋𝐷 (19) 
In the calculations above, deficits are equivalent to negative credits. The compliance period is 
characterized by 𝑇, which for our purpose is the fourth quarter of 2030 and 𝑡 = 0 corresponds 
to the first quarter of 2019. 
Table 7. LCFS CI Standards 
Year Gasoline Pool Diesel Pool 
2011 95.61 94.47 
2012 95.37 94.24 
2013 97.96 97.05 
2014 97.96 97.05 
2015 97.96 97.05 
2016 96.5 99.97 
2017 95.02 98.4 
2018 93.55 96.91 
2019 93.23 94.17 
2020 91.98 92.92 
2021 90.74 91.66 
2022 89.5 90.41 
2023 88.25 89.15 
2024 87.01 87.89 
2025 85.77 86.64 
2026 84.52 85.38 
2027 83.28 84.13 
2028 82.04 82.87 
2029 80.8 81.62 
2030 79.55 80.36 
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A.3 Credit Generation from Infrastructure Investment 
Owners of Fuel Supplying Equipment (FSE) generate Fast Charging Infrastructure (FCI) credits 
for investing in charging stations. 
FSE owner 𝑖 generates FCI credits according to: 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠𝐹𝐶𝐼
𝑖 (𝑀𝑇) = (𝐶𝐼𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑,𝑡
𝑋𝐷 ×  𝐸𝐸𝑅 −  𝐶𝐼𝐹𝐶𝐼) ×  𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐 × (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐹𝐶𝐼
𝑖 × 𝑁 × 𝑈𝑇 − 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝) × 𝐶 (20) 
where 
• 𝐶𝐼𝐹𝐶𝐼 = CA average grid electricity CI from Lookup Table 
• 𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐 = conversion factor for electricity 
• 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐹𝐶𝐼
𝑖 = the (kWh/day) daily FCI charging capacity of FSE 𝑖 
• 𝑁 = the number of days during the quarter 
• 𝑈𝑇 = the `uptime multiplier,’ which is the fraction of time that the FSE is available for 
charging during the quarter 
• 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 = the quantity of electricity dispensed (kWh) during the quarter 
• 𝐸𝐸𝑅 is for PHEV or electricity/BEV relative to gasoline. Currently this 𝐸𝐸𝑅 = 3.4 
A.4 Cap on Total FCI Credits 
In this paper, we assume credits from infrastructure bind at the cap, which is described here. 
The potential number of credits that can be generated from FCI charging infrastructure is 
calculated as: 
 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠𝐹𝐶𝐼
𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑀𝑇)𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠𝐹𝐶𝐼
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑞𝑡𝑟 × (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐼
𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑑
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐹𝐶𝐼
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 ) (21) 
Applications to generate credits are approved until 
 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠𝐹𝐶𝐼
𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 ≥  0.025 × 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑞𝑡𝑟 (22) 
A.5 Additional Figures 
This subsection of the appendix contains figures referenced in the text. Figure 8 shows 
projections for Brent oil prices, soybean prices, and CA GSP from the BAU simulations. Figure 9 
compiles a summary of the ULSD and BBD demand resulting in each compliance scenario, along 
with the corresponding diesel pool blend rate. Figure 11 shows an aggregate credit/deficit 
balance under each compliance scenario, while holding the diesel pool blend rate at 20 percent. 
This illustrates how many credits would still need to be generated when each set of 
assumptions is assumed. 
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 (a) Brent Oil Price (b) GSP 
 
(c) Soybean Prices 
Figure 8. Price Forecasts under BAU Variation 
 
 33 
 
(a) A0. Baseline 
 
(b) A1. Maximum Credits from ICS 
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(c) A2. Declining Ethanol CI 
 
(d) A3. Increasing BBD CI 
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(e) A4. Jerry Brown’s Goal Achieved 
Figure 9. Summary of the Diesel Pool under Compliance Scenarios
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Figure 10. Volume-Weighted CI of Ethanol from CARB ICS 
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Figure 11. Summary of Credit Shortages under Different Assumptions 
